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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will examine the standard of evidence required in proceed-
ings of a judicial nature held not in court, but before various administrative
authorities. The judicial nature of these proceedings derives from their in-
volvement with the deprivation of human rights and liberties.
There are two approaches to examining standards of evidence. The first
approach prefers the public's interest over the interest of the individual. The
second approach places the interests of the individual at the center and there-
fore emphasizes his or her interests as more valuable.
The implications of each approach are obvious. The first approach typi-
cally demands a lower standard of proof. Moreover, this approach does not
always require a judicial forum, but is often satisfied by procedures held by
any administrative authority. As for the second approach, its application re-
quires setting a heightened standard of proof when human rights are at stake.
Furthermore, the forum that utilizes the second approach in evaluating the
potential harm to these rights has to be judicial or quasi-judicial. At the very
least, the heightened standard requires, as in Israel, that when administrative
authorities make decisions concerning human rights, the individual involved
must have an opportunity to appeal to a court or some other judicial author-
ity.
Indeed, it seems that the Israeli Supreme Court has adopted the second
approach. This approach is reflected in the Israeli Supreme Court's decision
in the Sajadiyeh' case, where the Court acknowledged the problematic nature
of any decision by a non-judicial authority that deprives an individual's lib-
erty. The Court stated that this type of decision is very severe,2 and is al-
lowed only in circumstances involving the public order.'
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I. H.C. 253/88, Sajadiyeh v. Minister of Defense, 42 (3) P.D. 801.
2. Id. at 821.
3. In Sajadiyeh, the Israeli Court referred to "definite security reasons" involved in issu-
ing an administrative detention order. The Court also stated that the appropriate level of judi-
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As to standards of proof in general, there are three accepted standards:
(1) the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, that is mostly used in civil
cases and requires that the existence of a fact be more probable than its non-
existence (meaning that the evidence must be more than fifty percent likely
to be accurate); (2) the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, utilized in
criminal cases, that requires an approximately ninety-five percent probability
that the evidence is accurate (this standard is justified on the premise that
society prefers that a guilty man go free rather than an innocent man be con-
victed); (3) the third standard, which lies somewhere between the prepon-
derance standard and the reasonable doubt standard, is the clear-and-
convincing-evidence standard.4 The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard
requires that the evidence be at least seventy percent accurate, meaning that
the facts asserted must be highly probable. In the United States, the clear-
and--convincing standard has been applied in a number of civil controver-
sies and in hearings5 involving civil commitment,6 deportation,7 termination
of paternal rights,8 and denaturalization.9 Courts, however, have had a diffi-
cult time defining this standard.
In Israel, the existence of the clear-and-convincing standard is question-
able. This article will examine the use of such a standard and suggest a way
to define an intermediate standard that can be applied in non-judicial admin-
istrative proceedings that often involve decisions dealing with human rights.
The discussion will first focus on the standard of proof utilized in cer-
tain Israeli administrative practices conducted by the military and security
authorities. These administrative practices include house demolitions, ad-
ministrative detentions, and administrative deportations. The power to con-
duct such practices was granted to the Israeli military as a result of the emer-
gency situation declared in Israel and therefore is quite unique to Israel. The
discussion will then examine the standard of evidence in other practices that
are more common worldwide, and will particularly focus on two types of
practices: involuntary commitments and deportation hearings. These last two
practices will be discussed from the point of view of American law. Finally,
a suggestion will be made regarding the appropriate intermediate standard
that should be employed in Israeli administrative practices that deal with
human rights.
cial review that should be applied in these cases is to examine whether the decision of deten-
tion reflects the right balance between security needs and the fundamental tendency by which
an individual's liberty has to be respected. Id.
4. Louis Rabaut, Case Note, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), 57 J. URBAN L.
651, 654-55 (1980); Scott M. Brennan, Note, Due Process Comes Due: An Argument for the
Clear and Convincing Evidentiary Standard in Sentencing Hearings, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1803,
1804-05 (1992) (discussing the three standards of proof).
5. Brennan, supra note 4, at 1804.
6. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
7. Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1966).
8. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1982).
9. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960).
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II. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY
Since declaring independence, Israel has been under a constant emer-
gency situation because of external and internal threats to the State's exis-
tence. Thus, Israel was compelled to take measures to provide its executive
authority the means to protect the State's safety. 0 One example of such
emergency measures was the Defense (Emergency) Regulations enacted by
the British in Palestine in 1945." Inevitably, the exercise of such emergency
regulations and other legal methods can lead to human rights violations.
In Israel, the right to self-dignity and the right to equality are examples
of human rights that must not be violated, even under emergency situations. 2
Other rights are more vulnerable; for instance, the right to due process may
be violated when an emergency exists and there is no time to follow the nec-
essary procedures. Freedom of speech 3 and movement 4 also may be se-
verely curtailed in urgent situations, which may in turn lead to a decrease in
judicial supervision.
Yet, despite security needs, one cannot imagine that in a modem de-
mocratic State, individuals will be deprived of fundamental rights without a
proper opportunity to be heard. This notion was true before the enactment of
the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty," and has become even more
compelling with the enactment of that Basic Law and the resulting constitu-
tional revolution in Israel. 6
The following sections will examine several practices that have evolved
in Israel due to the continued emergency situation of the last fifty years.
A. House Demolitions
The authority to demolish and to seal up homes is a harsh example of
emergency action that can amount to human rights violations. When home
demolition occurs it usually involves collective punishment, as both the of-
fender and the offender's family suffer. In most cases, the actual offender is
10. Emanuel Gross, Criminal Code in Time of Emergency, 3 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 263
(1995) (Hebrew).
11. 1442 Palestine Gazette, Supp. No. 2, at 1055 (Sept. 27, 1945) [hereinafter 1442 Pal-
estine Gazette] (Hebrew).
12. RUTH GAVIZON, HUMAN RIGHTS i ISRAEL 136-37 (1994) (Hebrew) (discussing that
the use of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations (DER) to prevent a man from bringing his
case before court is prohibited by the Basic Law: The Government).
13. H.C. 73/53, "Kol-Ha'am" Ltd. v. Minister of the Interior, 7 P.D. 871; arts. 86-101 of
the 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regulations.
14. 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regulations, arts. 111, 112, 122-27.
15. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992 S.H. 150. The full text of this law is
reprinted in 31 ISRAEL L. REV. 21-23 (1997). See also H.C. 230/80, Kawasme v. Minister of
Defense, 35 (3) P.D. 113.
16. Until that time, human rights were derived from the powers of the official authority.
Now the powers of the official authority are derived from the human rights laws. In other
words, human rights became supreme law.
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dead or in jail and the home demolition action is specifically carried out to
hurt the members of the offender's household. 7 In this way, the authorities
also achieve their goal of deterring potential security offenders by making
them bear in mind the incidental consequences of their proposed action and
showing that their families may suffer.
The Israeli administrative authority applies this measure before the al-
leged offender is convicted, typically, very soon after the offense.'8 Article
119 of the 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regulations (1945 DERs) provides
the legal authority for house demolitions. 9 The breadth of the provision af-
fords tremendous discretion to the Military Government, as the provision
allows the Military Government to issue demolition orders as an exercise of
administrative authority without recourse to judicial proceedings. It requires
only that the military commander "ha[ve] reason to suspect" and "[be] satis-
fied" that an offense was committed."
In supervising this proceeding, the courts do not consider whether the
offender filed a criminal appeal; the court merely decides whether demoli-
tion orders meet the relatively lenient standards for review of administrative
actions. Moreover, the demolitions do not replace criminal punishment, as
the offenders are prosecuted for the same offense that gave rise to the demo-
lition."' Under Article 119 of the 1945 DERs, the administrative authority
can issue demolition orders for homes that were used directly in the comnis-
sion of an offense as well as for those houses in which the offenders simply
resided.
The Military Government is responsible for governing occupied territo-
ries. Therefore, it must fulfill its duty to minimize violence. The Israeli Gov-
17. C.A. 4772/91, Khizran v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 46(2)
P.D. 150; H.C. 2006/97, Janimat v. General Commanding the Central Command, 51(2) P.D.
651.
18. GAVIZON, supra note 12, at 143.
19. 1442 Palestine Gazette, supra note 11, at 1055, 1089, as amended by 1600 Palestine
Gazette Extraordinary, Supp. No. 2, at 1159 (July 31, 1947) [hereinafter 1600 Palestine Ga-
zette]. Art. 119 states, in part:
(1) A Military Commander may by order direct the forfeiture to the Government of
Palestine of any house, structure or land from which he has reason to suspect that
any firearm has been illegally discharged, or any bomb, grenade or explosive or
incendiary article illegally thrown, detonated, exploded or otherwise discharged, or
any house, structure or land situated in any area, town, village, quarter or street the
inhabitants or some of the inhabitants of which he is satisfied have committed, or
attempted to commit, or abetted the commission of, or been accessories after the
fact to the commission of, any offense against these Regulations involving vio-
lence or intimidation or any Military Court offense; and when any house, structure
or land is forfeited as aforesaid, the Military Commander may destroy the house or
the structure or anything in or on the house, the structure or the land.
The translation of Art. 119 is taken from Dan Simon, The Demolition of Homes in the Israeli
Occupied Territories, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1994).
20. Simon, supra note 19, at 16 (quoting art. 119 of the DER, 1442 Palestine Gazette).
21. Id. at 16.
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emnment explains the demolition policy as a necessary practice, positing that
while the criminal system does not adequately deter security offenders, dem-
olitions have great deterrent effect because they are immediately visible pun-
ishments.22
In Hamed v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region,23 the
Israeli Supreme Court broadened the demolition doctrine by relaxing the
standard of evidence required for demolition orders. The Court asserted that
a Military Commander may exercise his powers under Article 119 when he
"is satisfied" that an offense was committed.24 The Court was not concerned
with the fact that the information was obtained from the offender in the
course of his interrogation.25
In Khamri v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region,26 the
Court further broadened the prior practice of merely sealing homes into one
allowing demolitions as well. The decision relied on the principle that the
Court's review is limited to the lawfulness of administrative actions. Even
though the Court emphasized the harshness of the measure and declared that
it should only be applied in special circumstances following strict investiga-
tion and consideration, it concluded that a reasonable Military Commander
may apply the measure.27
In Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACR1) v. Commander of Cen-
tral Command,28 the Israeli Court's attitude appeared to change. Before this
ruling, most demolitions were carried out in the middle of the night, with no
possibility for appeal. The ACRI ruling relied on the right to be heard. Ac-
cepting this claim, the Court ordered that before the Military Government
can demolish a house, the family living there must receive notice and the
opportunity to initiate administrative proceedings as well as the opportunity
to appeal the administrative determination to the Supreme Court.29
Another case that reflects the change in the Court's point of view is
Khizran v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region." Justice
Heshin dissented in that case, stating that the demolition of an entire house
should be prohibited because it inflicts punishment on the members of the
offender's family. Previously, the Justice had rejected the notion that permit-
ted the demolition of an entire house as long as the offender's room could be
considered "inseparable" from the rest of the house.31 Justice Heshin con-
22. Id. at 10.
23. H.C. 22/81, 35 (3) P.D. 223.
24. Id. at 224.
25. Id.
26. H.C. 361/82, 36 (3) P.D. 439.
27. Id. at 444. See also Simon, supra note 19, at 29-30.
28. H.C. 358/88, 43 (2) P.D. 529.
29. ld. at 540-41.
30. H.C. 4772/91, 46 (2) P.D. 150.
31. H.C. 2665/90, Qarabsa v. Minister of Defense (unpublished).
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cluded that the Military Government may not seal or destroy an entire
house."
The Khizran dissent was soon followed by Turkeman v. Minister of De-
fense.33 In Turkeman, the Court introduced a proportionality test, meaning
that the Military Commander must consider not only the illicit action that is
being deterred, but also the harm caused to those affected by the deterrent
measure. Because destroying an entire house would inflict harm on the other
(supposedly innocent) family members, "a disproportionate-and therefore
unreasonable-measure."3'
The cases described above demonstrate the developing recognition and
concern for non-suspects whose human rights are affected by demolitions.
The Court eventually ruled that before a demolition order is issued, the
members of the offender's family should be given enough time to obtain
counsel and to be heard by the Military Commander, and, if necessary, peti-
tion the High Court of Justice.35 Moreover, the Court stated that, considering
the irreversible nature of the demolition, one must take into account the exis-
tence of innocent people living near the home of the offender.36 On the other
hand, the need for an efficient deterrent measure to maintain order must re-
main a consideration.
Undoubtedly, the Court took steps forward in considering not only secu-
rity concerns but also the interests of the offenders' families. The Court,
however, should have gone further and redefined the standard of proof that
is to be applied in home demolition cases. A specific standard would ensure
that Military Commanders conduct adequate investigation and gather essen-
tial evidence before ordering a home demolition. By defining a heightened
standard of proof, the Court could have assured greater protection for human
rights and would have prevented the Military Commander from issuing
demolition orders too frequently.
Furthermore, the Court should have defined adequate methods of gath-
ering evidence that could establish a proper factual basis for a house demoli-
tion order. The methods exercised while investigating, gathering informa-
tion, and examining the findings affect the reliability of the evidence upon
which the decision is based. Therefore, if the investigation or examination
methods do not meet the necessary standard, the decision made on the basis
of the evidence gathered may well be mistaken. The Court should have
guided the authorities in both matters: the standard of evidence required in
house demolition cases and the appropriate investigation and examination
methods to establish this standard.37
32. Khizran, 46 (2) P.D. at 159-61.
33. H.C. 5510/92, 48 (1) P.D. 217.
34. Id. at 220.
35. Commander of Central Command, 43 (2) P.D. at 540-41.
36. Khizran, 46 (2) P.D. at 159-61.
37. 6055/95 Tsemach v. Minister of Defense (not yet published) § 24 (Zanir, J.).
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B. Administrative Detentions
Another practice applied in Israel is administrative detention. This prac-
tice is an exception to the principle that no man should be deprived of his
liberty without due process of law. 8 As explained, in times of emergency
and national crisis, the legislature frequently abandons the basic principles of
its legal system for security reasons." Under such circumstances, the funda-
mental principle of due process is replaced by emergency legislation, which
enables the administrative authorities to deprive a person of liberty in an
administrative procedure, without being convicted in a criminal proceeding.'
While the intent of this article is to examine the practice of administra-
tive detention in Israel, it should be mentioned that this practice has been
carried out, at times, in a very harsh and careless manner outside of Israel. "'
A very extreme example arose during the course of World War II, when,
despite constitutional guarantees, approximately 110,000 residents and citi-
zens of the United States were exiled from their homes and placed in deten-
tion camps solely because of their national origin.' The U.S. Supreme Court
condoned this extreme action when it found that the practice did not contra-
dict the U.S. Constitution in any way. 3
Administrative detention is a harsh measure, as it involves the denial of
many important human rights:" the detainee is deprived of liberty without a
fair trial, the right to move freely, and the right to minimal due process. 5 The
problematic nature of administrative detention becomes very apparent when
comparing it to arrest before criminal trial.' An arrest occurs only after
prima facie evidence has connected a person to the offense committed. The
person is detained only if his release might endanger public safety. More-
over, the arrested person is given the opportunity to confront the proof
against him before a court of law. An administrative detention, however, is
not part of a criminal proceeding, as its purpose is to prevent a future event
rather than to inflict punishment for a committed offense.
In Israel, the denial of liberty involved in administrative detention
should be considered seriously, especially since the enactment of the Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which gave those human rights constitu-
38. This principle has been recognized in the United States. U.S. CONST. Amends. V &
XIV; see also Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S. H. 150, § 11 (Isr.).
39. Eyal Nun, Administrative Imprisonment in Israel, 3 PLILM 168, 172-73 (1992) (He-
brew).
40. Yehuda Weiss, Administrative Detention-Trends, Procedure and Evidence, 10
MISHPAT AND TZAVA 1, 4 (1989) (Hebrew).
41. Nun, supra note 39, at 168; Weiss, supra note 40, at 4; GAVIZON, supra note 12, at
143.
42. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
43. Id. at 219.
44. GAVIZON, supra note 12, at 140.
45. Gross, supra note 10, at 269.
46. GAVIZON, supra note 12, at 140.
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tional protection.' Therefore, a consideration of detention involves the just
balancing of public security and safety interests against the rights and liber-
ties of the detained.
The legal foundation of administrative detentions in Israeli law is the
Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law of 1979 (1979 Detention Law), which
replaced Section 111 of the 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regulations." The
1979 Detention Law led to major changes in the practice of administrative
detentions. The decision to issue an administrative detention order is now
made by the Minister of Defense49 rather than the Military Commander. In
addition, Section one of the 1979 Detention Law restricts the authority to
issue such an order to times of declared emergency.'
A major improvement, instituted by the 1979 Detention Law, concerns
judicial supervision of the administrative detention practice. Section Four
establishes that a detention order will be brought for review before the Presi-
dent of the District Court within 48 hours, and he may confirm, cancel, or
shorten the order. If the detainee is not brought before the District Court
within forty-eight hours, he will be released. Furthermore, the detainee now
has the ability to appeal the lawfulness of the detention to the Supreme
Court. The Minister of Defense may order detention for no more than six
months." This period may be extended, but the extension requires judicial
approval as well.5' The order must be examined periodically by the judge
after three months. Indeed, we may consider these judicial-review guaran-
tees as great improvements, as these changes are intended to prevent the ad-
ministrative authorities from abusing their power to order detentions.
Section two(a) gives the Minister of Defense the authority to issue an
administrative detention when he has "a reasonable foundation to assume
that for reasons of the State's safety or the public safety a certain man should
be held in detention." 3 This raises the question of the standard of proof and
adequacy of evidence necessary in this kind of procedure.
There are two types of evidence that could justify a detention: (1) evi-
dence about the potential detainee's past actions and offenses that estab-
lishes, to a degree of certainty, the possibility that this person is bound to
47. Gross, supra note 10, at 274.
48. 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regulations, § I I 11(1) ("A military Commander may by
order direct that any person shall be detained in such place of detention as may be specified
by the Military Commander in the order").
49. With one exception mentioned in Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law of 1979, §
2(b).
50. As mentioned above, an emergency has been declared in Israel continuously since its
declaration of independence. For this reason many critics do not consider Section one of the
Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law of 1979 to be much of an improvement. Yet, since the
reenactment of the Basic Law: The Government in 1996, the approval of the Kenesset [Israel
legislator] is required in order to enable the continuation of the declared emergency situation.
51. Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law of 1979, § 2(a).
52. Id. § 2(b).
53. Id
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commit similar offenses in the future; and (2) evidence that indicates a spe-
cific intention to commit a certain offense in the near future. '
The Minister of Defense must apply his discretion according to the ob-
jective test of "the reasonable man."5 In the case of Shahin v. Military
Commander of Gaza Region, 6 the Court ruled that the evidence to support
an administrative authority's decision need not be of the character of admis-
sible evidence required in proceedings before courts, however, "a rumor or
unchecked assumption is not satisfying enough."'
In Agbariah v. State of Israel,58 the Israeli Supreme Court demanded
evidence that indicated the existence of a real and serious danger, and proof
that not issuing the detention order may lead to action that involves danger
to the safety of the State and the public.59 In Agbariah, the Supreme Court
ultimately approved the detention decision of the Minister of Defense, who
relied on a summary of the factual basis of the specific case made by his as-
sistants.' Under Agbariah, the Minister, himself, is not required to review
the entire factual history before making a decision to detain a person and
deprive his liberty without trial. This is especially significant in light of the
fact that the Minister can extend the detention by six months "from time to
time."6' The Court held that the Minister could utilize this extension author-
ity more than once. 2 Therefore, there exists at least the theoretical risk that a
person could be detained for a very long period, without trial, pursuant to
administrative measures.63
These concerns might be alleviated to some extent if we bear in mind
that the decision of the Minister is reviewed by the Israeli District Court, as
explained above. Judicial review of the Minister's decision restricts his au-
thority in a few ways. First, the Supreme Court has held that the purpose of
administrative detention is not to punish a person for past actions; rather, its
purpose is to prevent the future danger this person is expected to cause to
public safety.6' Second, courts have emphasized that administrative detention
does not replace punishment and when a person can be charged in criminal
proceedings, the detention authority must not be executed' since it involves
54. Nun, supra note 39, at 169-70.
55. Id. at 185.
56. H.C. 159/84, 39 (1) P.D. 309 (1984).
57. Id. at 327.
58. H.C. 1/88, 42 (1) P.D. 840.
59. Id. at 845.
60. Id. at 843-44.
61. Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law of 1979, § 2(b).
62. H.C. 2/86, Ploni [Doe] v. Minister of Defense, 41 (2) P.D. 508, 511.
63. Weiss, supra note 40, at 16.
64. H.C. 1/82, Kawasme v. Minister of Defense, 36 (1) P.D. 666, 669.
65. Id.; H.C. 2/82, Lerner v. Minister of Defense, 42 (3) P.D. 529, 531; H.C. 1/80 Ka-
hane v. Minister of Defense, 35 (2) P.D. 253, 259; Ashkenazi, Emergency Powers (Deten-
tions) Law as a Model for Reform of Defense Regulations, 11-12 LAw & ARMY 121, 128-29
(1991) (Hebrew).
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deprivation of human liberty without trial. Furthermore, the Court ruled that
in determining whether to exercise this measure, its severity should be taken
into consideration, and that its exercise can be justified only as a last resort
and not as a first one.'
The Court's attitude has evolved regarding the scope of its role in re-
viewing the Minister's discretion. 7 At first, the Court took a minimalist posi-
tion, stating that it could review only the legality of the Minister's decision
and not its efficiency or its security justification, as the Court could not re-
place the Minister's considerations with its own judgments.68 Today the
Court holds a more expansive view, stating that its review aims to be wider,
so that a court can exercise its own discretion and can examine not only the
legality of the detention, but also the merits and the degree of essentiality of
such an action to accomplish the goals stated in section two of the 1979 De-
tention Law.'
Indeed, the Court's supervision, especially in its expanded form, may
have a very positive effect on the protection of human rights during the de-
tention process. Yet, the rights of the potential detainee are not totally en-
sured even in these proceedings before a court. The 1979 Detention Law
gives the Minister of Justice the power to restrict the right to legal represen-
tation by licensed military court defense counsel." In addition, the proceed-
ings are not public, but are held behind closed doors."
Although the 1979 Detention Law furthers the protection of human right
in many ways, Section six contains a significant limitation on the right to
due process. Under Section six, the administrative authority is permitted to
deviate from the evidence law when disclosure of evidence may jeopardize
the public or state safety. Moreover, when circumstances warrant, evidence
can be admitted without presenting it to the detainee or the defense counsel
and can even be admitted outside of their presence. 2 Given this possibility,
Security Authorities often find administrative detention much more conven-
ient than criminal prosecution.73 The Security Authorities also often claim
that the information regarding the detention is confidential, and therefore
request to hold the proceedings without the presence of the detainee.
Although the burden to convince the Court that the factual material
should be kept confidential lies on the Authorities, usually even a remote
possibility of exposing sources of information justifies keeping this informa-
66. H.C. 3280/94 Federman v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region (un-
published).
67. Ashkenazi, supra note 65, at 130-31.
68. Kahane, 35 (2) P.D. at 257-58.
69. H.C. 2/86, Ploni [Doe] v. Minister of Defense, 41 (2) P.D. 508, 515-16.
70. Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law of 1979, § 8(b).
71. Id.§9.
72. Id. § 6(a).
73. Weiss, supra note 40, at 8-9.
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tion confidential.7 ' In actuality, an alleged need for confidentiality will very
often prevent a defense counsel from having the opportunity to stage an effi-
cient cross-examination and will often prevent the detainee from seeing the
evidence held against him. Consequently, the responsibility of the Court to
evaluate the information and evidence is much greater. In particular, when
hearsay is presented as evidence and the source of the information does not
appear in court, the Court has only the Authorities' evaluation of that
source.75 When evaluating the admission of hearsay evidence, the Israeli Su-
preme Court has applied a standard that requires the anticipated danger to
public safety be severe enough to make it essential to deprive the detainee of
the right to a proper defense.76 A possible but remote and marginal danger to
the State's security is not sufficient to keep the evidence confidential.77
Hence, administrative detention is justified in cases where detention is nec-
essary to prevent a proven danger and the detainee, for some reason, cannot
be convicted in criminal proceedings." In these cases, the necessity justifies
maintaining the confidentiality of the evidence as well.79
In the matter of administrative detentions, it seems that the Israeli Court
properly considered the contradicting interests of public security and safety
on the one hand, and the rights of the detainee on the other. The Court de-
ternined that the Minister of Defense must establish the degree of probabil-
ity to a "close certainty" evidence standard before he can exercise his deten-
tion authority."
Although the administrative authorities in Israel have the broad discre-
tion to order harsh detention measures, the 1979 Detention Law contains
changes that place some restraint on this discretion. The judicial supervision
that has become a part of the detention procedure limits the discretion of the
administration authority. Although uncertainty still exists as to the exact
level of evidence required, the Israeli Court has progressed by adopting a
"close certainty" evidence standard for detentions, and it seems right to
adopt similar standards regarding other emergency arrangements.8
C. Deportations
The last Israeli administrative security practice that needs to be exam-
ined is the issuing of Deportation Orders. The authority to issue deportation
74. Id.
75. id. at 13-14.
76. H.C. 1/80 Kahane v. Minister of Defense, 35 (2) P.D. 253, 259.
77. Weiss, supra note 40, at 13.
78. Mainly because it is impossible to disclose the informants or the way of gathering the
evidence.
79. Nun, supra note 39, at 171.
80. H.C. 3280/94, Federman v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region (un-
published); Rabbi Ginzburg v. Minister of Defense and Prime Minister, 50 (3) P.D. 221-22
(1996).
81. Ashkenazi, supra note 65, at 152.
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orders is derived from Article 112 of the 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regula-
tions. 2 In the past, Article 112 authorized the Minister of Defense to issue a
Deportation Order against any person in Israeli territory without trial, with-
out properly proving the person guilty, and without giving the person a real
chance to appropriately defend himself by challenging the evidence raised
against him.83 This very broad and disturbing authority was canceled by Ar-
ticle twelve of the 1979 Detention Law. The broad deportation authority,
however, was changed only with respect to citizens of Israel; the broad au-
thority can still be exercised upon the residents of restricted occupied territo-
ries.
The Israeli Supreme Court ruled that while exercising authority under
Article 112, the Minister85 must take into consideration provisions of Article
108.86 Article 108 states that an order will not be issued unless the Minister
of Defense believes that "it is necessary or expedient to make the order for
securing the public safety, the defence of Palestine, and/or the maintenance
of public order."87
In the past, the Israeli Supreme Court tended to limit the degree of its
review over the Minister's decision,88 and avoided reviewing the legitimacy
of the Minister's considerations. More recently, the Court seems to have
changed its approach. With an awareness that it is difficult to prove that a
deportation order is unlawful, the Court adopted the position that a person
who is attempting to assert his rights should not have his rights limited by
burdening him with too strict a standard.'
Regarding the nature and standard of evidence required to justify a de-
portation order, the Court held that a rumor or an unchecked assumption did
not satisfy the standard.91 The deportation decision should be based on fac-
tual information that a "reasonable man" would find adequate (while taking
into account the content and the source of the information).' Furthermore,
the Court stated that given the severity of the administrative deportation
practice, the administrative authority must be convinced that the facts estab-
lishing the need for deportation are "clear, unequivocal, and convincing. '
82. 1442 Palestine Gazette, supra note 11, at 1085.
83. Gross, supra note 10, at 274.
84. Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law of 1979, § 8(b).
85. H.C. 240/51, Al Rahman v. Minister of the Interior, 6 P.D. 364 (stating that the au-
thority to order deportation was given only to the Minister of Defense).
86. H.C. 97/79, Abu Awad v. Regional Commander of Yehuda and Shomron, 33 (3)
P.D. 309 (1979).
87. 1442 Palestine Gazette, supra note 11, art. 108.
88. Ashkenazi, supra note 65, at 138.
89. H.C. 17/71, Mrar v. Minister of Defense, 25 (1) P.D. 141, 146.
90. H.C. 792/88, Mator v. West Bank Commander, 43 (3) P.D. 542; Ashkenazi, supra
note 65, at 140.
91. Mator, 43 (3) P.D. at 548.
92. Weiss, supra note 40, at 15.
93. H.C. 22/89, Mator v. Regional Commander of Yehuda and Shomron, 43 (2) P.D.
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The discussion regarding the admission of confidential evidence in ad-
ministrative detentions also applies in deportation cases." The Minister of
Defense has the power, under Article forty-four of the Evidence Order [New
Version] 1971, to present to the Court a sealed certificate claiming that the
safety of the State will be compromised if the evidence is revealed.9"
As indicated earlier, the Court should take into consideration the impact
of keeping information from the deportee on the deportee's ability to defend
himself. The Court has stated that the potential deportee should be informed,
in general, about the actions attributed to him, and the reasons for issuing a
deportation order against him.96 In addition, the Court ruled that a potential
but remote and marginal risk to the State's safety cannot justify the refusal to
reveal evidence. 7 The Court has ruled that information may remain confi-
dential if disclosure may create a significant security risk or a real and sub-
stantial risk of exposing and endangering confidential intelligence sources,
such that the need to reveal evidence to ensure justice is not paramount over
the security interest in non-disclosure.98
The recent court rulings demonstrate that the Israeli Court has made an
attempt to protect the potential deportee's rights by examining the eviden-
tiary foundation for the decision in administrative deportations." Further-
more, the Court, today, tends to examine whether the right to be heard has
been appropriately respected."° The Court has held that proceedings before
the Counseling Board, which reviews the deportation orders, must be public
and that the deportee should be given the opportunity to present witnesses.''
The Court has also held that unless security concerns make it impossible, a
deportation order cannot be issued unless the deportee has had notice, an
opportunity to be heard and an opportunity to appeal before being de-
ported."° This ensures an examination of the justification for the deportation
before the order is executed.
0 3
Despite all of the above and other human rights guarantees that the
Court has tried to include in its decisions, the Israeli Court still approved the
221, 222-23 (1989) (relying on the holding in H.C. 159/84, Shahin v. Regional Commander
of Gaza, 39 (1) P.D. 309, 327).
94. Weiss, supra note 40, at 12-13.
95. Evidence Order, art. 44 (1971) (Isr.) (Hebrew).
96. H.C. 497/88, Shahsheer v. West Bank Commander, 43 (1) P.D. 529.
97. Id. at 539.
98. Mator v. Regional Commander of Yehuda and Shomron, 43 (2) P.D. 221, 222-23
(1989).
99. 2 AMNON RUBINSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 1179-80
(Amnon Rubinstein & Barak Medina, eds., 1996).
100. Id.
101. H.C. 103/92, Bolous v. Counseling Board, 46 (1) P.D. 466; H.C. Abu Samhadna v.
Counseling Board, 46 (1) 626.
102. H.C. 5973/92, The Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defense, 47
(1) P.D. 268, 289.
103. H.C. 230/80, Kawasme v. Minister of Defense, 35 (3) P.D. 113; The Association for
Civil Rights in Israel, 47 (1) P.D. at 289.
13
Gross: Human Rights in Administrative Proceedings: A Quest for Appropria
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2001
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31
exercise of this authority in a very extreme decision where the security au-
thorities deported 415 residents of the occupied territories.' In The Associa-
tion for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defense"° (Civil Rights Deporta-
tion case), 415 residents were deported because they were suspected of being
members of the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad terrorist organizations." 6 The
Civil Rights Deportation case is an example of the Court's tendency to re-
frain from intervening when faced with possible security issues. 7 In that
case, the Security Authority carried out the deportation by issuing individual
orders without preliminary notice.' Moreover, the Security Authority issued
a general order that was later determined to be illegal."° The Israeli Supreme
Court disqualified the general order as it did not afford a right to a prelimi-
nary hearing. "' The Court's determination, however, had no effect on the
actual outcome, as the deportations were approved insofar as the Court
stated that these orders were based upon specific information regarding each
deportee; a factual foundation was established for each and every deporta-
tion."' The fact that the deportation orders were allegedly individualized
does not necessarily prove that the action was not a mass deportation. On the
contrary, a number of factors suggest that the Security Authority's action
constituted mass deportation even though mass deportations are prohibited
by international law."' The number of deportees, the quick fashion in which
the orders were issued, and the identification mistakes of potential deportees
support the conclusion that the Security Authority's action amounted to a
mass deportation. These factors also demonstrate that special consideration
was not given to every deportation and that the examination of evidence was
not adequately thorough, despite the harsh consequences." 3 The Court ruled
that, although preliminary hearings were not held, the deportation orders
were not final because there was a possibility for post-deportation hear-
ings. " Yet, it makes a big difference whether the deportee is heard before or
after being deported, "5 because if he is heard before, it may prevent the dep-
104. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 47 (1) P.D. at 289.
105. Id.
106. id.
107. Leon Shelef, Mass Deportation as a Failed Deterrent-Considerations of Criminal
Law, 4 PLiM 47, 50 (1994) (Hebrew).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 55.
110. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 47 (1) P.D. at 285-86.
111. ld at281.
112. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 49 ("Individual or mass forcible transfer,
as well as deportations of protected person from occupied territory to the territory of the Oc-
cupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of
their motive.").
113. Shelef, supra note 107, at 52.
114. Id.
115. Mordechai Kremnitzer, The Deportee Deported-A Few Comments on the Decision
Involving the Deportee, 4 PLIIvM 17, 19-20 (1994) (Hebrew).
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rivation of his rights and the forced expulsion from his homeland. Consider-
ing all of the above, this case raises the inevitable question of whether the
Court actually believed that for each and every deportee there was "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence" that established deportation as the
only way to prevent the danger posed by the deported individual."6
It is easy to protect the individual's rights in tranquil periods, but the
heavy responsibility on the Court is to protect those rights in times of emer-
gency. In the Civil Rights Deportation case, it seems that the Court deviated
from the previously established standard of proof, and the implications of
such a deviation are severe. Perhaps the Court should have set an even
higher standard. In any event, the Court is not sending the right message to
the administrative authorities when it does not follow the standard that it
sets, and it does not emphasize the importance of thorough examination and
investigation before allowing a deportation order.
III. OTHER NON-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
The situations described above are quite unique and limited to Israel due
to the constant emergency situation. There are, however, other types of non-
judicial proceedings, that do not involve security matters, that are more
common outside of Israel, and can involve the deprivation of human rights.
The standard of proof required in these non-emergency cases must be con-
sidered. The non-emergency cases that will be discussed are cases of invol-
untary commitment,"7 deportation hearings,"' denaturalization hearings,"9
and expatriation hearings.'20 In the United States, courts apply a clear-and-
convincing-evidence standard of proof when reviewing these types of cases.
A. Involuntary Commitment
1. The United States
In Addington v. Texas,' the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard of proof in
proceedings for an involuntary, indefinite civil commitment must be greater
than a preponderance of the evidence but does not necessarily have to be as
great as the reasonable-doubt standard; the intermediate standard of clear
and convincing evidence was thus determined to be constitutionally ade-
quate.' In considering involuntary commitments, and in determining the
116. Id. at21.
117. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
118. Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
119. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
120. Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955).
121. 441 U.S. 418.
122. Id. at 433; Rabaut, supra note 4, at 561.
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standard of proof required in such proceedings, one must bear in mind the
contradictory goals these proceedings aim to achieve: to protect society and
the public welfare from dangerously-disordered individuals, as well as to
care for these individuals and to protect their rights and liberties from unnec-
essary and unjustified harm.'23
According to these goals, the State's right to commit individuals is justi-
fied under the parens patriae power,"' meaning the State's paternalistic
power and duty to care for incapable individuals, to protect such individuals
from themselves, and to help incapable individuals to overcome their mental
illness by providing treatment and rehabilitation." The State's police power,
which is the State's right and duty to protect the public health, safety, and
welfare from dangerous and violent, mentally disturbed individuals, is an-
other justification."26 While exercising this power, the State must not oppress
individuals beyond the extent necessary to accomplish the objective.
Indeed, although the power of the State may justify involuntary com-
mitment, there are approaches that focus on an individual's rights... and em-
phasize an individual's right to live life without external intervention, espe-
cially in a democratic society. When a person is committed unwillingly, the
person suffers the loss of liberty. Moreover, the person is deprived of many
other rights such as the right to privacy, the right to live as a member of so-
ciety, the right to live with family, and the right to move freely. Indeed, the
Israeli Supreme Court has recognized involuntary commitments as "one of
the severest and most oppressing forms of depriving [an] individual's lib-
e r t y .
'128
In most cases the committed person's reputation is severely damaged,
and the person is sentenced to live with the stigma of having been "mentally
ill,"' 9 even after being released. The "mentally ill" label may greatly reduce
the committed person's chances of reintegration into society even when the
person was erroneously committed. Therefore, the logical conclusion is that
the standard of proof in these proceedings should be determined by balanc-
ing the respective interests involved.
Prior to the Addington130 case, U.S. courts issued varying opinions re-
garding the question of standards of proof. A number of courts analogized
the civil commitment proceeding to a criminal proceeding and required the
123. AMNON BEN-DROR, THE LAW OF PROTEGES 164 (1998).
124. Rabaut, supra note 4, at 655-56 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 419, 426);
Dan Shnit, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in Israeli Law, 8 TEL Aviv U. L. REv. 529,
532 (1982) (Hebrew).
125. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Despite this state power, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the state cannot commit an individual simply because he is mentally
ill. Id. at 575.
126. Rabaut, supra note 4, at 656-57; Shnit, supra note 124, at 532.
127. BEN-DROR, supra note 123, at 160.
128. H.C. 196/80, Toledano v. State of Israel, 35(3) P.D. 332, 336.
129. BEN-DROR, supra note 123, at 161.
130. 441 U.S. 418.
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beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard,' as both cases involve a similar loss
of liberty and stigmatization. Other courts utilized the preponderance stan-
dard.1
3 2
In Mathews v. Eldridge,33 the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out the fac-
tors that should be considered in determining the required Due Process pro-
tections: (a) the private interest to be affected; (b) the risk of erroneous dep-
rivation of the interest and the value of alternate safeguards; and (c) the
Government's interest. Taking these factors into account, the Addington
Court evaluated the standard of proof required for civil commitments."3 The
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the preponderance standard because the court
concluded that the application of such a standard increased the likelihood of
an erroneous commitment and pronounced that "an individual's interest in
not being erroneously placed in an institution, and hence deprived of his lib-
erty outweighed the state's interest in caring for mentally disturbed individu-
als, as well as protecting the rest of the populace" from the mentally ill. 35 In
addition, the Court stated that the function of the legal process is to "mini-
mize the risk of erroneous decisions,"'36 and declared that "individual[s]
should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the
possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible
harm to the state.' 37 Hence, the Court decided that the preponderance stan-
dard should not be used, as the potential error in using it severely jeopardizes
important individual liberty interests. 3 1
The Addington Court rejected the reasonable-doubt standard as well.
The Court distinguished civil commitment proceedings from criminal prose-
cutions, as a civil commitment does not have the same impact as a criminal
trial. 39 As opposed to the punitive nature of a criminal proceeding, a civil
commitment aims to provide medical care to the individual;' the State's
interest is not merely to protect society, but also to protect the individual
from himself and to offer rehabilitation. 4' Furthermore, the reasonable-doubt
standard has historically been reserved for criminal cases, and applying such
131. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1976); see also In re Ballay, 482
F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
132. See Rabaut, supra note 4, at 659.
133. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
134. Id.
135. Alaya B. Meyers, Rejecting the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard for Proof
of Incompetence, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1016, 1035 (1997) (quoting Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979)).
136. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
137. Id. at 427.
138. See Brennan, supra note 4, at 1822.
139. Meyers, supra note 135, at 1019.
140. Lawrence M. Kopeikin, Conservatorship of Roulet and Cramer v. Tyars: Inconsis-
tency in Involuntary Civil Commitment Protections, 68 CAL. L. REv. 716, 723-24 (1980).
141. Id. at 728-29.
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a high standard might prevent the state from fulfilling its goals. 42 The Court
did not want an overly broad use of the reasonable-doubt standard to harm
the special moral force"" that this standard brings to criminal law.
Additionally, the principle in criminal proceedings that a guilty man
should go free rather than an innocent man be convicted does not apply to
civil commitments. Not committing a mentally ill person might have graver
consequences than not convicting a guilty man, as he will not receive the
treatment he needs. Another major difference is that criminal proceedings
require determination of past factual events, while commitment proceedings
require a determination of future dangerousness that must be established by
medical testimony. Due to the lack of certainty in medical diagnosis, the
State may never be able to meet the reasonable-doubt standard. This might
lead to a failure to commit individuals who need medical treatment.'"
On the other hand, given the limitations of psychiatry and psychology
which are not exact sciences, we must conclude that the low standard of
proof is not adequate. Psychiatry is not developed enough to reliably predict
the outcome of a failure to commit a mentally ill person or to establish the
degree of his dangerousness. The psychiatric diagnosis might reflect factors
that are irrelevant to the case; the person who orders the commitment might
be influenced by the disabled person's age, sex, or status in society.'" Ac-
cordingly, the low standard is not sufficient, as it may lead to a high rate of
erroneous commitments.
The Addington Court finally adopted the clear-and-convincing standard,
stating that it strikes a fair balance between the rights of the individual and
the legitimate concerns of the State.'" This case has put an end to semantic
exercises in procedural nomenclature in the area of due-process require-
ments for involuntary commitments. By establishing the minimum require-
ments, the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed the individual states the freedom
to determine higher standards. 47 Courts must now weigh the relative inter-
ests of the State and the individual in light of the effect of the procedure im-
posed. And in cases of involuntary commitments, the U.S. Supreme Court
has already stated that the required standard is the clear-and-convincing
standard. The practical significance of this ruling is that facts asserted must
be found highly probable and that a lower probability is insufficient when
individuals are involuntarily committed.
142. Id. at 730.
143. See 441 U.S. at 428.
144. Rabaut, supra note 4, at 663.
145. BEN-DROR, supra note 123, at 168-69.
146. 441U.S. at431.
147. Rabaut, supra note 4, at 670.
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2. Involuntary Commitments in Israel
The treatment of mentally ill individuals in general, and the involuntary
commitment issue in particular, are regulated by the Israeli Treatment of
Mentally Ill Act of 1991 (Mentally Ill Act), which replaced the former Act
of 19552"8 The Mentally Ill Act reflects a liberal commitment to individual
rights, as well as to the protection of the mentally ill. The Israeli Legislature
preferred what has been termed the "Judicial Approach,"' 9 which focuses on
the individual's liberties, and demands the establishment of a judicial basis
for every decision to commit a person. The Judicial Approach conflicts with
the "Medical-Paternalistic Approach," which emphasizes society's duty to
take care of individuals in need and justifies involuntary confinement based
on medical considerations. 5" Protecting an individual's rights and liberties
became much more important in Israel after the enactment of the Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty, which established the individual's fundamental
right to liberty and privacy (the very rights that are jeopardized when one is
faced with involuntary commitment).' Indeed, the Mentally Ill Act was leg-
islated before the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and therefore,
although the latter cannot be applied directly, the Mentally Ill Act should be
interpreted according to its spirit.
Influenced by the trend emphasizing individual's rights, the Mentally Ill
Act added the requirement of a medical examination, which must be per-
formed as a condition for involuntary commitment.52 Moreover, the Men-
tally Ill Act established that an order to commit a person may only be issued
if a degree of "certainty" exists and requires that alternative and less severe
means be utilized, if possible.'53 In addition, the possibility of appealing to
the Psychiatric Committee has been broadened.' The Mentally Ill Act states
that the main goal of confinement is to ensure that mentally ill persons re-
ceive medical treatment."' Furthermore, a person cannot be committed only
in the name of protecting the individual or society, or where the commitment
is not found to be in accordance with the provisions mentioned in the Act." 6
The District Psychiatrist is the main authority regarding involuntary
commitment in Israel. Provided that the conditions set forth in the Act are
fulfilled, he may order an urgent or a non-urgent examination 7 and an ur-
148. Treatment of Mentally Ill Act, 1991 S.H. 58 (Isr.) [hereinafter Mentally Ill Act].
149. BEN-DROR, supra note 123, at 158-59.
150. Id.
151. Mentally Ill Act, supra note 148, § 12.
152. ld. § 26.
153. Id. § 35(c).
154. Id. § 12.
155. Id. § 35.
156. H.C. 1025/92, Plomit [Doe] v. Attorney General, (1) P.M. 410, 426 (1993).
157. Mentally Ill Act, supra note 148, §§ 6 & 7.
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gent or a non-urgent involuntary commitment' 55 for one week. He may also
extend the confinement by one week. The Psychiatric Committee supervises
the District Psychiatrist's decisions and decides appeals. 59 The decisions of
the medical authorities are subjected to the Court's judicial review'" The
Court examines the procedures, the factual basis for commitment decisions,
and reliability of the procedures.
While a voluntary commitment 6' requires the committed person's con-
scious consent and a psychiatric examination, involuntary commitment can
be executed only if the examination has been held and specific requirements
are met. Involuntary commitments require the following: (1) the subject re-
fuses the commitment of free will; (2) he displays derogated judgment or
understanding of reality, as caused by the illness; and (3) one of the legal
causes for commitment is present. 62
Section seven-two of the Mentally Ill Act gives the District Psychiatrist
the authority to order non-urgent commitments. 63 Furthermore, the District
Psychiatrist has the authority to order an urgent involuntary commitment
when the person "might put himself or others in an immediate physical dan-
ger.""' Before ordering an urgent commitment, the person must undergo an
examination, and the District Psychiatrist has to be "convinced" that all the
legal requirements have been fulfilled and that the commitment is neces-
sary.1
65
Prior to the Mentally Ill Act, there was no clear standard of proof or
declaration of the nature of the evidence required in commitment proceed-
ings,'16 so these matters fell to the District Psychiatrist's discretion and juris-
diction. This highly unacceptable situation was criticized when it was argued
that given the low degree of accuracy (and all other limitations) of psychia-
try, the standard of proof required to demonstrate the dangerousness of a
person should be determined by the law and not by psychiatrists, who will
tend to decide by the lowest standard of proof.67 Today, the District Psychia-
trist does not freely determine the standard of proof. The psychiatrist's "con-
viction" has to be based on objective evidence, and not on simple evalua-
tion. 6 The "conviction" must be based on a physical examination because,
without it, the facts considered will not be firsthand, and the patient will not
158. Id. § 9.
159. Id. § 12
160. Id.
161. Id. § 4.
162. BEN-DROR, supra note 123, at 175-76.
163. Id. at 212-19.
164. Mentally Ill Act, supra note 148 § 6(2).
165. Id. § 9.
166. Adi Parush, The Grounds for Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Ill in Israeli
Law, 13 MIsHPATIM 377, 384 (1984) (Hebrew).
167. Shnit, supra note 124, at 549.
168. Plonit [Doe] v. Attorney General (not yet published).
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be given the opportunity to explain his actions." The purpose of the "con-
viction" standard is to assure a higher degree of certainty in predicting future
behavior. The commitment should require specific facts, such as past violent
incidents. Secondhand evidence (such as testimony of relatives and social
workers) cannot be applied, as before.7'
The Israeli Supreme Court has not yet discussed directly the meaning of
"dangerousness," but it seems that the narrow interpretation of "immediate
danger of severe violence,"'' which outweighs the individual's liberty,
should be applied. In protecting the individual's rights, the Mentally Ill Act
also applies "The Least Restrictive Alternative Principle," which states that
as long as the purpose of commitment can be achieved in any other way that
less severely harms the individual's liberty, the individual should not be
committed. "'
Pursuant to the Mentally Ill Act, the requirement of "might endanger
himself or others"'7 must be established according to the standard of "high
probability," "likely possibility," or "substantial fear."'74 These standards are
very close to the American standard of "clear and convincing evidence.""'
In conclusion, a trend to elevate individual's rights over paternalistic
considerations is evident in Israel. The same trend can be seen in the U.S.
courts. Yet, the standard of proof required in Israel has not been as clearly
determined. At the same time, the Israeli courts have already applied a stan-
dard close to the American one. In addition, Israeli courts must consider the
guarantees of rights and liberties in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Lib-
erty and the constitutional revolution. After balancing all the interests in-
volved, the clear conclusion is that an intermediate standard of proof, similar
to that of "clear and convincing evidence," should be applied in cases of in-
voluntary commitment.
B. Deportation Hearings
In the United States, an alien who is the subject of deportation proceed-
ings will not be deported to a country in which the alien's life or freedom
might be threatened. 76 The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the relevant Sec-
tion of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Immigration Act) as requiring
169. H.C. 1025/92, Plonit [Doe] v. Attorney General, (1) P.M. 410, 423 (1993).
170. BEN-DROR, supra note 123, at 191.
171. H.C. 219/79, Yarmalovich v. Hovav, 35 (3) P.D. 766, 778.
172. Parush, supra note 166, at 405.
173. Mentally Ill Act, supra note 148, §§ 6(2) & 7(2).
174. H.C. 1025/92, Plonit [Doe] v. Attorney General, (1) P.M. 410, 426 (1993).
175. Rimona Durst & bit Meretyk, Therapy versus Authority in Compulsory Hospitali-
zation from the Clinician's Perspective, 3 MISHPAT UMMISHAL 119,138 (1995) (Hebrew).
176. Immigration and Nationality Act § 243 (h), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982)).
21
Gross: Human Rights in Administrative Proceedings: A Quest for Appropria
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2001
236 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31
an alien to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she will be per-
secuted if deported to stay the deportation hearing.'
77
In Woodby v. I.N.S.,' 78 the U.S. Supreme Court looked at two cases
involving deportation orders for resident aliens. The Court concluded that
the government must establish the facts supporting deportability by "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence.' 71 9 Furthermore, the Court ruled that
a state could terminate the liberty interests of persons subject to deportation
only by a heightened standard. 8' The issue of deportation demands striking a
balance between two conflicting policies of humanitarianism and protection-
ism. On the one hand, the United States stands for human rights and free-
doms and has always kept the doors open to those seeking a better life. On
the other hand, deportation is supported by some U.S. citizens because of
their unemployment concerns and fears that a large influx of aliens could
endanger the country's identity. 8'
1. The Deportation Procedure2
The deportation process is carried out in the U.S. under the jurisdiction
of the Attorney General, who exercises his or her authority through the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.). When the Attorney General
decides on deportation, the alien is ordered to show cause against deporta-
tion in a hearing before an immigration judge.' The alien is allowed to pre-
sent evidence, to cross-examine government witnesses, and to be represented
by counsel.' u The I.N.S. must establish deportability by clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence.' If a deportation order is issued, the alien may
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals and then may seek judicial re-
view. 86
2. The Alien's Burden of Proof Under Section 243(h)
During the hearing, the alien may ask to withdraw his deportation order
under Section 243(h) of the Immigration Act. The alien however, bears the
burden of establishing the likelihood of persecution if deported. In most
cases, the immigration judge requests the State Department's opinion of the
177. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984).
178. 385 U.S. 276.
179. Id. at 286.
180. Meyers, supra note 135, at 1034-35.
181. Shaun Kathleen Healy, The Alien's Burden of Proof Under Section 243(h): How
Clear is Clear Probability?, 17 IND. L. REv. 581, 581-82 (1984).
182. Id. at 585-88.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1984).
186. Healy, supra note 181, at 585-88.
187. Id.
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likelihood of persecution in a particular country. The State Department's
opinion, may be excluded from the hearing record in the interest of national
security, if found to be confidential. Generally, attempts to cross-examine
the authors of these opinions have been denied, and an alien, in actuality, has
no opportunity to refute the opinion, especially when the information is con-
fidential. Therefore, if the State Department renders an unfavorable opinion,
it will be very difficult in most cases to meet the criteria for Section 243(h)
of the Immigration Act. Moreover, the chance of refuting an unfavorable
State Department opinion is unlikely, given that most aliens have very lim-
ited evidence-gathering resources and options.
The Refugee Act of 1980'88 amended Section 243(h) of the Immigration
Act. The amended section now provides that "the Attorney General shall not
deport or return any alien.., to a country if the Attorney General determines
that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion."'" 9 Given the grave consequences an alien might face
upon deportation, an alien's request should be given fair consideration. Be-
cause an alien faces the difficult task of obtaining evidence that demon-
strates his eligibility for Section 243(h) relief, the determination of the bur-
den of proof is very important. Humanitarian principles are threatened when
the standard of proof is set at unreachable heights. On the other hand, a very
low standard of proof would allow any alien to escape deportation and such
a situation could create havoc in the immigration procedure. One of the ma-
jor changes with the amendment is that once 243(h) eligibility is established,
the Attorney General must withhold deportation. Prior to the amendment,
even after Section 243(h) was satisfied, the Attorney General had the discre-
tion to go forward with the deportation.
As for the standard of proof, the Supreme Court in LN.S. v. Stevic held
that an alien must establish a "clear probability" that he will be subject to
persecution."' The Court stated that the standard requires a showing that it is
"more likely than not" the alien will be persecuted upon deportation. 9 It
seems that the Court's language actually established a new standard, so that
clear probability now simply requires the alien to show that persecution is
more likely than not, in order to be afforded relief under the section.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the U.S. Supreme Court declared, "[i]n cases involving individual
rights... 'the standard of proof [at a minimum] reflects the value society
188. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C. (1982)).
189. Healy, supra note 181, at 583 n.12 (quoting Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. §
1253(h) (1982)).
190. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984).
191. Id. at 424.
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places on individual liberty'."" This ruling implicates the fundamental prin-
ciple of due process, which recognizes that as the importance of the rights at
stake increases, the extent of the procedural safeguards must increase. Thus,
in a case involving an individual faced with losing a significant liberty inter-
est due process requires a high degree of procedural protections. 3
In my opinion, Israel should learn from the American experience and
the U.S. Supreme Court's "clear-and-convincing standard" in cases of invol-
untary commitments and deportations, by establishing similar intermediate
standards in cases involving human rights. On the one hand, in such cases
the "preponderance-of-the-evidence standard" is not adequate, particularly in
light of the fact that the decisive authority is not a court but an administrative
authority. On the other hand, the "beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard" will
be too high, for instance in those cases where security concerns require the
deprivation of a person's right and security considerations make it hard to
prove those concerns to the highest degree.
The English Court has also discussed this issue of what standard to ap-
ply in such situations,'94 and stated in Bater v. Bater'95 that
there is no absolute standard in either case. In criminal cases the charge
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but there may be degrees of
proof within that standard... ; so also in civil cases. The case may be
proved by preponderance of probability, but there may be degrees of
probability within that standard. The degree depends on the subject mat-
ter.
'196
It seems that, in the 1950s, the Israeli Supreme Court already adopted
this approach. In Greenwald,'" the Israeli Supreme Court held that there are
no absolute standards, and the degree of proof required depends on the sub-
ject matter. 8 The Court stated that the criminal standard of "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" and the civil standard of "preponderance of the evidence" are
not accurate formulas, but practical and convenient standards.'" The degree
of proof may differ from case to case according to the seriousness of the
matter." The Court thus acknowledged, a long time ago, the relative nature
of standards of proof and the need for an intermediate standard. Further-
192. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436
F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971)). See also Kopeikin, supra note 140, at 730-31.
193. Brennan, supra note 4, at 1871.
194. ELIAHU HARNON, LAW OFEVIDENCE pt. 1,216-17 (1973).
195. [1950] 2 All E.R. 458.
196. Id. at 459. The English Court repeated this approach in later cases. Hornal v. Neu-
berger Products, Ltd. [1956] 3 All E.R. 970, 973, 976-77; Blyth v. Blyth [1966] 1 All E.R.
524, 529.
197. Cr.A. 232/55, Attorney General v. Greenwald, 12 P.D. 2017 (1955).
198. Id. at 2063.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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more, the Court has adopted such intermediate standards in civil cases in-
volving the protection of human rights.
In the Laor case, the Israeli Supreme Court reviewed the Films and
Plays Review Board's decision to restrict the display of a play that might
invoke negative sentiments."0' The Board decided to restrict the play because
it compared the Israeli army to Nazi forces (a depiction that would no doubt
anger the Jewish population in Israeli and portray the Israeli government in
an unfavorable light). The Court stated that the appropriate balance between
the public's interests and the individual's freedom of speech demands that
freedom of speech be curtailed only when the damage caused to public order
would be severe, harsh, and serious.2" As for the authority of the Board, the
Court required the "close certainty" standard to be established before it
could restrict the freedom of speech.0 3
In the recent case of Senesh v. Broadcasting Authority,' the Israeli Su-
preme Court discussed again the appropriate balancing between the freedom
to create and the freedom of speech, on the one hand, and the public's inter-
est in order, on the other. The Court stated that there is not just one balanc-
ing formula between contradicting interests; rather, the formula differs ac-
cording to the interests involved. 5 The Court held once again that only se-
vere, harsh, and serious damage to public sentiment may justify the limita-
tion of the freedom of speech. The Court required that the probability of the
occurrence of this damage must meet the "close certainty" standard. The
Court, however, held that in unique and exceptional circumstances, "reason-
able probability" may suffice.'l
From all of the above, it may be concluded that the Israeli Supreme
Court has already utilized intermediate standards and has acknowledged the
possibility of applying different standards, depending upon the circum-
stances and the human right that is at stake. Therefore, it does not seem too
demanding to require the Israeli administrative authorities, the very authori-
ties that are often called upon to determine the fate of human rights, to strike
the appropriate balance before depriving an individual's rights or liberty.
Considering their duty to respect and protect individual's rights, those au-
thorities should be compelled to utilize the proper intermediate standard of
proof, which should be determined, as described, in light of the right or lib-
erty at stake.
201. H.C. 14/86, Laor v. Theater Review Board, 41 (1) P.D. 421.
202. Id. at 435.
203. Id. at 436.
204. H.C. 6126/94, Senesh v. Broadcasting Authority 53(3) P.D. 817.
205. Id. at 833-34.
206. Id. at 837-38.
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